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Abstract
We consider in this paper the information-theoretic secure key distribution problem over
main and wire-tap noise channels with a public discussion in presence of an active adversary. In
contrast to the solution proposed by ourselves for a similar problem using hashing for privacy
amplification, in the current paper we use a technique of extractors.
We propose modified key distribution protocols for which we prove explicit estimates of key
rates without the use of estimates with uncertain coefficients in notations O,Ω,Θ.
This leads in the new conclusion that the use of extractors is superior to the use of hash
functions only with the very large key lengths ` (of order ` > 105 bits).
We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting from two consecutively executed
stages. At the fist stage it is generated a short authentication key based on hash function,
whereas at the second stage it is generated the final key with the use of extractors. We show
that in fact the use of extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also
some constructive estimates of the key rates for such protocols.
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1 Introduction
Advances in design and implementation of quantum computers [1] as well as design of super-
fast multiprocessor conventional computers threat some conceptually secure cryptosystems. Hence
perfect one-time pad ciphers proposed by Shannon [2] are necessary. But the use of perfect ciphers
requires key lengths proportional to messages [3]. This inconvenience can be solved with the use
of key distribution over communication channels protected from eavesdropping. There are several
approaches in order to remove (or at least to control) an eavesdropping on the keys:
• quantum channels [4],
• methods based on fluctuation of radio wave channels [5, 6, 7, 8],
• Wyner’s concept of wire-tap channel,
• key generation by hashing of random string initially distributed over noisy channels [9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
In the current paper, we follow the last approach. The most advanced results in this setting,
under the condition of an active adversary have been obtained by Maurer and Wolf. They proposed
several key distribution protocols [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] and made a performance
comparison of asymptotic and non-asymptotic key rates for a given level of key security.
We considered in [22] some modification of the Maurer and Wolf’s MW-protocol consisting in
using an authentication algorithm over noisy channels, called by ourselves the α-protocol, instead
of the request-response algorithm presented in [17]. In the same paper [22], we proposed also the
β-protocol that differs from the α-protocol in absence of the hash function transmission over public
discrete channel because the hash function can be formed from the string which the users have got
just after the execution of the initialization phase. Using the β-protocol entails an increasing of
the key rate in several cases. We proposed also in [22] the so called α′ and β′-protocols in which
special initially distributed short keys are used in order to provide authentication procedures over
public discussion channels (PDC).
Hybrid protocols comprising pairs of sequentially executed protocols (α, α′), (α, β′), (β, α′),
(β, β′) were investigated in [22]. The first protocol in each pair is used to generate an authentication
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key, whereas the second one provides a generation of the main secret key for encryption/decryption
given the authentication key. The relation among the key rates and a comparison of protocol
performance evaluation were also introduced.
The main feature of the protocols considered in [22] is their strict constructiveness because the
parameters determining their efficiency do not contain unknown coefficients typical for O,Ω,Θ-
estimations.
Our contribution and novel content in the current paper are the following:
1. We propose some new (modified) key distribution protocols using extractors. We prove ex-
plicit estimates of key rates without the use of estimates of uncertain coefficients in O,Ω,Θ-
estimations. (In [22] we solved the similar problem using hash functions instead of extractors).
In contrast to [17], we consider a scenario where the legal users are able to receive raw bit
strings over noisy channels and as a consequence they are pairwise distinct. This entails the
need to send check symbols from user A to user B in order to agree the raw bit strings received
by legal users. By the same reason, we have changed the authentication algorithm: instead of
a request-response algorithm [17], we use a non-interactive one based on the authentication
code.
A consideration of the non-asymptotic case leads us in the new conclusion that the use of
extractors is superior to the use of hash functions only for very large key lengths (`) of the
order of 105 bits.
2. We suggest hybrid key distribution protocols consisting of two consecutively executed stages.
At the first stage, a short authentication key based on a hash function is generated, whereas
at the second stage, the final key using extractors is generated. We show that in fact the use
of an extraction procedure is effective only at the second stage. We get also explicit estimates
of key rates for such protocols.
3. We prove also an asymptotic behavior of the key rates for all considered protocols that allows
to compare the potential efficiency of them with the potential efficiency of protocols considered
here and in [22].
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The outline of this paper is the following: Section 2 contains the preliminaries and descriptions
of the main procedures to be used in key distribution protocols. In Section 2.1 we describe the
model of key distribution based on noisy wire-tap channels in the presence of an active adversary
and we introduce the main criteria for key distribution protocol efficiency. We introduce main
procedures as error correction, authentication and privacy amplification (based both on hashing
and extraction). In section 3 we describe the αext-protocol, and the new key distribution βext-
protocol without transmission of the extractor’s seed on the public discussion channel and we prove
their main features. In section 4 we present a modification of the previous α′ext and β′ext-protocols
under the condition that initially the legal users share short authentication keys. In section 5 we
describe the so called hybrid protocols as combinations of different pairs of single protocols and we
estimate their performance evaluation. In section 6 we conclude the paper.
2 Main notions and procedures involved in the key distribution
protocol
Here, we repeat mostly the content of the same point as in [22]. It is done in order to provide an
independent reading of the current paper.
2.1 Model for key distribution and the main criteria for protocol efficiency
Let us consider the model of key distribution between a legal user, Alice (A), and another user, Bob
(B), in the presence of an active adversary, Eve (E), assuming that initially the legal users do not
have shared secret keys. The key distribution protocol (KDP) consists of two phases: initialization
and key generation.
In the KDP initialization phase, A, B, and E receive random i.i.d. sequences X = {xi}ki=1,
Y = {yi}ki=1, Z = {zi}ki=1 ∈ {0, 1}k, respectively, such that for each i, Pr (xi 6= yi) = pm and
min{Pr (xi 6= zi) ,Pr (yi 6= zi)} = pw (see Figure 1). One of the methods to provide legal users A,
B with the sequences X, Y is to generate the truly random sequence S = {si}ki=1 ∈ {0, 1}k by
some trusted party, say source S, and then to transmit it to the legal users A and B over noisy
channels (as in the source model [9], [12]). We will assume that A and B receive the sequences X, Y
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Figure 1: Model of key distribution protocol over noisy legal channels in presence of an active
adversary.
over binary symmetric channels (BSC) without memory with error probabilities piA = Pr (xi 6= si),
piB = Pr (yi 6= si), while the adversary E receives the sequence Z over a BSC with error probability
piE = Pr (zi 6= si). It is easy to see that if the original sequence S is truly random then the
same property holds for the sequences X, Y and Z. (Examples of practical implementation of the
initialization phase in real world can be found in [22]). In this phase it is natural to assume that
the adversary is unable to intervene the transmission from S to A and B.
The key generation phase consists in an information exchange over a public discussion channel
(PDC) with a goal to share eventually the final key. We note that the use of PDC is necessary
in order to send check symbols to test the agreement of the strings X and Y and sometimes for
the parameters of the hash function or extractor seed transmission (see details in the following
sections). The adversary E can receive all information transmitted over the PDC. We assume also
that the PDC’s between legal users and E are binary noiseless channels (if E does not intervene
in transmission). However E can change or replace this information as desired and therefore it is
necessary to authenticate messages transmitted over a PDC in order to detect any intervention of
E and to reject suspicious messages.
Let us define the following parameters of the key distribution protocol characterization:
`: the key length (the number of bits which are contained in the keys KA and KB),
I(KA, U): the amount of Shannon’s information in possession of the adversary E about the
final key KA after receiving all acceptable information U , including the sequence Z and the
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other messages transmitted over the PDC
Pe = Pr (KA 6= KB): the probability of legal users keys disagreement,
Pf : the probability of false rejection of the KDP protocol (when A or B falsely believe that E has
intervened the PDC),
Pd: the probability of deception false information provided by E during information transmission
over PDC (it can result in an opportunity to fix a key between any legal user and E although
leaving the legal user on the belief that he (she) has shared a key with his (her) legal partner),
Rk: the key distribution rate (the ratio of the key length ` to the length of sequences X, Y ),
Rk =
`
k .
It is reasonable to impose the following conditions on the KDP:
` = `req, (1)
I(KA, U) ≤ Iadm, (2)
Pe ≤ P adme , (3)
Pf ≤ P admf , (4)
Pd ≤ P admd , (5)
where `req denotes the required key length and the superscript adm stands for admissible parameter
value. We will say that the above conditions are requirements of the KDP. The efficiency of the
KDP will be estimated by the key rate Rk and then among all protocols satisfying (1)-(5), we will
select the most efficient by making Rk to attain its largest value. As we will show later, some
inequalities (2)-(5) may randomly hold. Then an additional requirement can be stated as
Prisk ≤ P admrisk , (6)
where P admrisk is the probability that at least one of the inequalities (2)-(5) does not hold.
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2.2 Known asymptotic results regarding key rates
Let us denote by R∗, R∗∗ the maximum achievable key rates in a KDP between the legal users
under the condition of a passive or active adversary, respectively. In the papers [12], [14], [17], [19]
the proofs of these values were presented. For the source model of the wire-tap channel with
initialization phase in the KDP using BSC with probabilities piA, piB, piE the following theorem
holds:
Theorem 1 (see [19]) If piE > piA and piE > piB , then R
∗ = R∗∗. If either piE ≤ piA or piE ≤ piB
then R∗∗ = 0.
We note that under the conditions piE > piA and piE > piB, the users A and B either share the key
or they may detect interception in the case of E’s intervention. This fact cannot be interpreted as
a defect of KDP because E can use even a simple strategy: she tries to break off the PDC between
legal users in order to impede the completion of the KDP. Let pm, p
A
w, p
B
w , denote the probabilities
of disagreements among the sequence pairs (X,Y ), (X,Z), (Y,Z) respectively. Then
pm = piA + piB − 2piApiB
pAw = piA + piE − 2piApiE
pBw = piB + piE − 2piBpiE
It is easy to see that if piE > piA then p
A
w > pm and similarly if piE > piB then p
B
w > pm. We will
consider the worst case for legal users as pw = min{pAw, pBw}.
After the execution of the initialization phase the source model is reduced to the channel model
where user A sends the sequence Xk to user B who receives it as Y k, whereas E receives Xk as Zk.
Then the probability of error on the main virtual BSC between A and B is pm and the probability
of the wire-tap virtual channel from A to E is pw. (The PDC remains the same after such reduction
of the source model to the channel model.)
Theorem 2 (see [19]) In the channel model setup with probabilities pm, pw the maximum key
distribution rate is
R∗ = g(pw)− g(pm), (7)
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where p 7→ g(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) is the entropy function.
2.3 Error correcting codes
Let C be a binary linear error-correcting (k+ r, r)-code and let Cr be a string consisting of r check
symbols. It has been proved in [23] that if the information symbols are transmitted on the BSC
with the error probability pm, whereas the check symbols on the noiseless channel, then the average
error probability of decoding on the ensemble of all (k + r, r)-codes meets the following modified
Gallager’s bound
Pe ≤ 2−k E(Rc), (8)
where
E(Rc) = max
ρ∈(0,1)
[
E0(ρ)− ρ(2Rc − 1)
Rc
]
, (9)
E0(ρ) = ρ− (1 + ρ) log2
(
p
1
1+ρ
m (1− pm)
1
1+ρ
)
(10)
is Gallager’s function for a BSC with the error probability pm
Rc =
k
k + r
(11)
is the code rate. We note that in the frame of the above model, the code rate Rc satisfies the
inequality
0 ≤ 2Rc − 1
Rc
≤ C∗, (12)
where C∗ = 1− g(pm) is the capacity of the BSC with the probability of error pm.
It follows from (12) that 12 ≤ Rc ≤ 11+g(pm) . In the asymptotic case Rc → 11+g(pm) , then
r = k g(pm). (13)
We see from (13) that an arbitrary small value of the erroneous decoding probability is achieved
for large block length if the number r of check symbols (but not block length) is proportional to
the number of information symbols k with coefficient g(pm).
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2.4 Authentication based on the class of universal hash functions
In order to execute the authentication procedure, we use the universal hash function which are
described below.
For any finite set A, let |A| denote its cardinality. For any two finite sets A,B, let H be a set of
hash-maps A→ B. For each x0, x1 ∈ A, let δH(x0, x1) = |{h ∈ H| h(x0) = h(x1)}| be the number
of hash functions in H that collide in x0 and x1. We recall that H is universal2, U2 in short, if for
each x0, x1 ∈ A, δH(x0, x1) ≤ |H||B| .
Let Pcol be the so called collision probability, namely the probability that there occurs a pair of
elements in A colliding under an uniformly chosen map h ∈ H. Clearly, Pcol ≤ |B|−1. The class H
is strongly universal2, SU2, if
∀x ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B : |{h ∈ H| h(x) = y}| = |H||B| (14)
and besides for any distinct x0, x1 ∈ A, and any y0, y1 ∈ B,
|{h ∈ H| h(x0) = y0 & h(x1) = y1}| ≤ |H||B| .
For a given  > 0, the class H is -almost universal, -AU2, if for all x0, x1 ∈ A: δH(x0, x1) ≤  |H|.
The class H is -almost strongly universal, -ASU2, if (14) holds and for any pairs x0, x1 and y0, y1
of distinct points in A and B,
|{h ∈ H| h(x0) = y0 & h(x1) = y1}| ≤  |H||B|2 .
Naturally, each class |B|−1-ASU2 is also SU2.
Examples of hash functions classes: We assume that the sets A and B consist of all binary
sequences of lengths a and b, respectively: A = {0, 1}a, B = {0, 1}b, hence |A| = 2a, |B| = 2b.
An U2 class. The set A can be identified with the Galois field GF (2
a). For each s ∈ GF (2a),
let hs : A→ B, x 7→ bxscb, where the map z 7→ bzcb takes the b least significant bits in z. The
class {hs}s∈A is U2. Such hash functions are described uniquely by binary strings of length
a.
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An SU2 class. For each s, t ∈ GF (2a), let hst : A → A, x 7→ sx + t. The class {hst}s,t∈A
is SU2 and clearly this class can be indexed by sequences of length 2a.
An -ASU2 class. It has been shown in [24] that the hash functions chosen from an -
ASU2 class are connected with incomplete balanced schemes. The parameters of the -ASU2
class can be described as
|A| = q2i , |B| = q , |H| = qi+2 ,  = i+ 1
q
, (15)
where q is a power of a prime and i > 1 is an integer.
Let us analyze the procedure of message authentication. Let x be the message to be authenticated
during its transmission from user A to user B. User A forms the authenticator y = h(x) of his
message x using the keyed hash function h ∈ H known by him (but unknown for adversary the
E), then A appends y to x and sends the pair (x, y) to the legal user B. In order to check the
authenticity of the message x, the user B receives a pair (x˜, y˜) (which may be forged), B forms the
authenticator ˜˜y = h(x˜) with his knowledge of the secret hash function h and compares ˜˜y with y˜. If
they coincide then B accepts x, otherwise he rejects it.
It was shown in [24] that if the hash functions, chosen from the -ASU2 class, are used in the
authentication procedure then for the best adversary’s strategy consisting in an impersonation or
substitution of the messages, the following probability bounds hold
Pi ≤ |B|−1, (16)
Ps ≤ , (17)
where Pi is the probability of message impersonation, and Ps is the probability of message substi-
tution.
Let us define the probability of undetected false message deception by the adversary as P =
max{Pi, Ps}. The bounds (16), (17) will hold only if the active adversary ignores completely the
used hash function h in the authentication procedure. But there may be situations when the keyed
hash function is partly known by the adversary although authentication procedure is still possible.
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In order to clarify this situation let us recall initially from [14] that for a discrete random variable
ξ taking values over a set X with probability distribution Pξ the minimal entropy is
H∞(ξ) = − log max
x∈X
Pξ(x),
and the Renyi entropy of the random variable ξ is
H2(ξ) = − log
∑
x∈X
P 2ξ (x). (18)
Theorem 3 (see [25]) Suppose legal users A and B have the random key h with length `0 within
an authentication scheme based on -ASU2 hash functions where  = 2
−b˜. Denote by U the total
knowledge of E about h. Then, assuming that for any sample u
H∞(h |U = u) ≥ t`0, 0 < t < 1, (19)
the probability Pd of message undetected deception is upper bounded as
Pd ≤ 2−
(
b˜−`0(1−t)
2
−1
)
.
2.5 Authentication based on noisy channels
The message authentication considered above and based on the use of hash functions from either the
class SU2 or the class -ASU2 requires a possession by legal users of the secret or partly secret keys.
However such keys cannot be taken directly from the strings Xk, Y k shared in the initialization
phase because they differ even for legal users. On the other hand it is impossible to conciliate
these string by sending from A to B the check symbols strings of Xk because PDC is get not
authenticated and B could “conciliate” formerly the false string Zk with E.
In order to avoid this situation it is necessary firstly to design a keyless message authentication
based on noisy channels. In [12] a special type of codes has been proposed in order to solve this
problem: the so called authentication codes (AC). Let us describe them briefly.
In an initialization phase the users share the strings Xk, Y k over a BSC (Pr (xi 6= yi) = pm) and
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they agree an error correcting binary systematic (na, ka)-code V in order to authenticate a length
ka message. The authenticator w = (w1, . . . , wna) of a message m is formed as follows: for each
i let vi be the i-th bit of the codeword in V corresponding to m and wi = vi if vi = 1, or let it
remain undefined otherwise.
After receiving a pair (m˜, w˜), the user B forms his authenticator ˜˜w for the message m˜ using
his string Y k according to the agreed procedure and compares w˜ with ˜˜w. If the number of the
coinciding bits in them is less or equal to some given threshold ∆w then the message m˜ succeeds
as authentic, otherwise it is removed as forged. The AC’s were investigated in [12] and can be
characterized by two probabilities:
Pf . the probability of false removal of the message although adversary E does not intervene at all;
Pd. the probability of the deception of false message, i.e. the probability of the event that E has
forged a message and this fact was not detected by B.
Pf and Pd do not depend on ordinary minimum code distance of the code V but on the so called
minimum asymmetric semidistance d01 that is determined by the minimal number of differences
between 0 and 1 symbols in any pair of distinct code words of V .
Theorem 4 (see [22, 26]) Let V be an (na, ka)-AC with constant Hamming weight τ for all non-
zero codewords and with asymmetric semidistance d01. Then the probabilities Pf and Pd for the au-
thentication procedure on noisy wire-tap channel with parameters pm and pw, can be upper bounded
as follows:
Pf ≤
τ∑
i=∆w+1
(
τ
i
)
pim(1− pm)τ−i,
Pd ≤
∆w∑
i=0
(
d01
i
)
pim(1− pm)d01−i ·
∆w−1∑
j=0
(
τ − d01
j
)
pjm(1− pm)τ−d01−j .
It is a very hard problem to find d01 for any linear code. But there exists a very simple method to
design the code V with known d01, given the linear (n0, k0)-code V˜ with known ordinary minimum
code distance d proposed in [12].
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Namely, let us substitute the symbol 1 with the symbol pair 10 and the symbol 0 with 01 in
V˜ .Then evidently the parameters of the code V are:
na = 2n0 , ka = k0 , d01 = d , τ = n0. (20)
We have proved in [22] the following theorem with the use of the above code.
Theorem 5 Let V be a (k0 + r0, k0)-error correction code with minimum distance d that is used
in the authentication procedure. Then for any p, q > 0 there exists an integer k′0 and an AC,
guaranteeing r0k0 < q, Pf ≤ p, Pd ≤ p for all k0 > k′0.
It follows from this theorem that
r0
k0 + r0
→ 0 as k0 → +∞.
This means that the length of the authenticator approaches zero as the block length tends to
infinity. Other methods to design constant weight AC were investigated in [27].
2.6 Extractors
Let us recall the notion of extractor and strong extractor [28, 29, 30]. Two probability distributions
P,Q, defined on the same set X, are called -close if their statistical difference
dif(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX(x)−QX(x)|
does not exceed . A map E : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}u → {0, 1}` is an (η, )-extractor if for any probability
distribution random variable X on {0, 1}k such that H∞(X) ≥ η and any uniformly distributed
random variable Γ on {0, 1}u, the statistical difference probability distribution of the extractor
output E(X,Γ) with respect to an uniform distribution on {0, 1}` is at most . In order words, the
extractor maps a random sequence X of length k with symbols taken from an ensemble of minimal
entropyH∞(X) to a random sequence of length ` that is -close to an uniformly distributed sequence
with the help of a truly random sequence Γ of length u. The last sequence can be seen as a “seed”
of the extractor. The extractor E(X,Γ) has parameters (k, η, u, `, ), where k is the length of
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input random sequence, η is the evaluation of minimal entropy (H∞(X) ≥ η) on the set of input
sequences, u is the length of the seed Γ, ` is the length of the output sequence, and  is the statistical
distance between the output probability distribution and an uniform distribution on the output
set.
A mapping E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}` is called a strong extractor E(X,Γ) if for any proba-
bility distribution random variable X on the set {0, 1}k having minimal entropy H∞(X) ≥ η and
for any uniformly distributed random variable Γ on the set {0, 1}u the probability distribution of
the concatenated variables (Γ ◦ E(X,Γ)) is close to an uniform distribution on {0, 1}`+u. More
specifically
dif
(
Γ ◦ E(X,Γ), Uu+`
)
≤ .
This means that the strong extractor provides the closeness of probability distribution for the
concatenation of the output extractor sequence and the seed sequence to an uniform distribution.
In the current paper, we will consider only extractors based on the construction [28, 29] which is
an improvement of the originally proposed by Trevisan [30].
Theorem 6 (see theorem 22 in [29]) For every k, H∞(X), ` ∈ N and  > 0, such that ` ≤
H∞(X) ≤ k, there are explicit strong (H∞(X), )-extractors E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}`−∆ with
u = O
 log22 (k )
log2
(
H∞(Xk)
`
)
 , (21)
or
u = O
(
log22
(
k

))
· log2
(
1
µ
)
, (22)
where 1 + µ = k`−1 , µ <
1
2 and ∆ = O(d). The value ∆ is the loss of extractor output sequence
length.
The first extractor (21), with H∞(X
k)
` constant, is used for extraction of an arbitrary part of
randomness (H∞(Xk)) from the input sequence Xk, whereas the second one (22) is needed in order
to extract all randomness ` = H∞(Xk) from the input sequence Xk.
We are not going to use the estimates based on the O-operator and therefore let us find a more
accurate estimate for the length of the seed. For this reason we consider in greater detail the design
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Figure 2: Design of the Trevisan’s extractor.
of the Trevisan’s extractor modified by Raz, Reingold, Vadhan [29].
In order to design the Trevisan’s extractor it is necessary to realize three components:
1. The linear error code W : With parameters (n˜, k) and minimal code distance dw, where
n˜ = 2ν , ν ∈ N. It is proposed to take this code as a concatenation of the Reed-Solomon and
the Adamar codes.
2. Combinatorial block design scheme. (Balance incomplete block design, BIBD). This is a family
of sets S = {S1, S2, . . . , S`} holding the following properties:
Si ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , u},
|Si| = ν,
i 6= j =⇒ |Si ∩ Sj | < log c with c ≥ 1. (23)
This means that the family consists of ` sets or blocks, each consisting of ν elements taken
from the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , u}, while the number of elements contained simultaneously
in any pair of blocks is at most log c. Such construction is designated as a (ν, c)-scheme.
3. Boolean function f : This map is defined over {0, 1}ν and for each a1, . . . , aν ∈ {0, 1},
f(a1, . . . , aν) is a codeword of the (n˜, k)-code W .
The design of the extractor based on the three components given above is presented in Figure 2.
The algorithm is executed in the following stages:
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1. The input sequence x is encoded as w with the error correcting (n˜, k)-code W . The word w
gives the value of the Boolean function f : {0, 1}ν → {0, 1}`.
2. The random sequence γ of length u determines the samples γ|Si, consisting of ν symbols of
γ with the use of blocks Si belonging to the (ν, c)-BIBD. This means γ|Si = [γ]s∈Si .
3. Output w = f
(
(γ|Si)`i=1
)
as the result of the extractor.
In the modified extractor version at [29], it was proposed to use a (ν, c)-weak scheme, in which the
condition (23) is changed by the condition
∑
j<i
2|Sj∩Si| ≤ c(`− 1),
where c is some constant, c > 1. The length n˜ of the code W is chosen in [29], p. 106, according
to the condition
log(n˜) = O(log
k

).
Since w is the output of a Boolean function with ν arguments, n˜ should be equal to 2ν . Obviously
this condition will be fulfilled if
ν =
⌈
log
k

⌉
, (24)
where dxe is the “ceiling” of x (the least integer greater or equal than x).
The characterization of strong extractor is determined by the following statements.
Theorem 7 (Proposition 10 in [29]) If S = (S1, . . . , S`) (with Si ⊂ γ) is a weak (ν, c)-design
for
c =
1
`
[
H∞(Xk)− 3 log `

− u− 3
]
, (25)
then E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}u → {0, 1}` is a strong (H∞(Xk), ε)-extractor.
Theorem 8 (Lemma 15 in [29]) For every ν, ` ∈ N and c > `, there exists a weak (ν, c)-design
S = (S1, . . . , S`) (with Si ⊂ γ) and
u =
⌈ ν
ln c
⌉
· ν. (26)
Moreover, such a family can be found in polynomial time poly(`, u).
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Theorem 9 (Lemma 17 in [29]) For every ν, ` ∈ N and 0 < µ < 12 , there exists a weak (ν, 1+µ)-
design S = (S1, . . . , S`) (with Si ⊂ γ) with u = O
(
ν2 · log 1µ
)
. Moreover, these families can be
found in polynomial time poly(`, u).
The results of Theorem 6 will be avoided in our further investigation because a presentation of
the output sequence length u in the form `−∆ is inconvenient in the optimization procedure.
We will get an estimate of u taken from the results of Theorems 7-9 directly. More specifically,
using (24) and (26) one can write the relation for the necessary number of seed symbols for the
first extractor (21) in Theorem 6:
u =
⌈⌈
log k
⌉
ln c
⌉
·
⌈
log
k

⌉
. (27)
For the second extractor (22), it follows from the proof of lemma 17 in [29] that u0 =
⌈
ν
ln 2
⌉ · ν,
where u = τ · u0, τ =
⌈
log 4µ
⌉
, 0 < µ < 12 . Then in terms of (26) we get
u =
⌈⌈
log k
⌉
ln 2
⌉
·
⌈
log
k

⌉
·
⌈
log
4
µ
⌉
.
2.7 Privacy amplification
The procedure of privacy amplification (PA) at the final stage of the key generation between users A
and B has been investigated in detail in [10, 17]. PA can be implemented either by hashing [10, 17]
or by extraction [28]. We will consider in the current paper the second approach.
In order to compare our new results with the results obtained in [22] where hashing has been
used as the privacy amplification procedure, let us specify an application of both methods.
The sequence Xk of length k bits is mapped by the user A to the sequence X`A of length `
through a keyless hash function from the class U2, or SU2. In a similar manner the user B forms
his key X`B after error-correcting his sequence Y
k.
The most important parameter of the PA procedure is the residual Shannon’s information
received by the adversary E, concerning the final key KA = KB. The estimates of this information
leaking of E are given in [10, 17] for different settings of wire-tap channels. The more general bound
is presented below.
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Theorem 10 (see [10]) Let Xk be the sequence of length k transmitted from A to B over a BSC
with the error probability pm and received by B as the sequence Y
k. Assume also that Zk is the result
of receiving Xk by the adversary E over a BSC with probability pw, while the Renyi information
contained in Zk about Xk is t. Let H be a U2-class of hash functions from {0, 1}k into {0, 1}`,
known by all participants (A, B and E) and let h ∈ H be a truly random hash function chosen
by A, transmitted to B over a PDC. If the users A and B compute their keys as KA = h(X
k),
KB = h(Y˜
k), then the amount of Shannon’s information about the keys KA,KB is upper bounded
as
I(KA;Z
k, h) ≤ 2
−(k−`−t)
ln 2
. (28)
The Renyi information t is connected with the Renyi entropy H2(X
k|Zk) as
t = k −H2(Xk|Zk). (29)
For the BSC used as wire-tap channel we have by (18)
H2(X
k|Zk) = −k log (p2w + (1− pw)2) .
If the adversary receives some extra information about Xk aside the information contained in Zk
(for instance the sequence Cr of check symbols of length r eavesdropped by E over the PDC), then
the amount of conditional Renyi entropy H2(X
k|Zk, h, Cr) that received E can be estimated by the
theorem 11 appearing below. (This theorem also gives the estimation of the amount of conditional
minimal entropy H∞(Xk|Zk, h, Cr) which we use later).
Theorem 11 (see [17]) Let X and C be two random variables and let s > 0. Then the following
inequalities hold:
H2(X)−H2(X|C = c) ≤ log |C|+ s (30)
with a probability at least 1− 2− s2−1,
H∞(Xk)−H∞(Xk|C = c) ≤ log |C|+ s (31)
with a probability at least 1− 2−s.
18
We can apply (30) in order to estimate H2(X
k|Zk, h, Cr). Then we get
H2(X
k|Zk, h, Cr) ≥ H2(Xk|Zk, h)− r − s. (32)
It follows from (29) and (32) that
t˜ = k −H2(Xk|Zk, h, Cr)
≤ k −H2(Xk|Zk, h) + r + s
= t+ r + s. (33)
Substituting t˜ from (33) into (28) instead of t, we get the upper bound of Shannon’s information
leaking to E
I(KA;Z
k, h, Cr) ≤ 2
−(k−`−t−r−s)
ln 2
,
that holds with a probability Prisk ≤ 1 − 2 s2−1. In order to compare the performance of privacy
amplification based on hashing and on extraction, let us prove a new lemma establishing a con-
nection between the Shannon’s information leaking to adversary regarding the key at the output
of the extractor, and the statistical difference among distribution of the final key and an uniform
distribution.
Lemma 1 If the statistical distance between the output of the extractor generating the length ` key
and an uniform distribution is at most , then the amount of the Shannon’s information concerning
the key got by any adversary is upperly bounded as
I(K`;Zk|Γu) ≤ 2`√.
Proof. The following inequality holds by definition of strong extractor
dif(Γu ◦ Ext(Zk,Γu), V `+u) ≤ . (34)
The meaning of this inequality is that the probability distribution of the concatenation of the
extractor’s output and the “seed” Γu is close enough to an uniform distribution. In order to
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simplify the notation, let us denote by D the term at the left of (34). We note initially that for an
uniform distribution on the space V `+u, the following equality holds
D = MΓu [dif(Ext(Z
k, γu), V `)]. (35)
where γu is a random sequence and MΓu [·] is the expectation with respect to the distribution on
Γu. In fact, D itself can also be expressed as the term:
1
2
∑
γu,e`∈E
∣∣∣PE|Γu(e`)PΓu(γu)− PV `(v`)PV u(vu)∣∣∣ , (36)
where e` is the output sequence of the extractor E.
Since the distributions PΓu(γ
u) and PV u(v
u) are both uniform, the term (36) gives:
D =
1
2
∑
γu
PΓu(γ
u)
∑
e`∈E
∣∣∣PE|Γu(e`)− PV `(v`)∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
γu
PΓu(γ
u)dif(Ext(Zk,Γu), V `)
= MΓu [dif(Ext(Z
k, γu), V `)]
proving (35). By combining (34) and (35) it is obtained
MΓu [dif(Ext(Z
k, γu), V `)] ≤ . (37)
Using the well known Markov’s inequality, (37) implies
PΓu
[
dif(Ext(Zk, γu), V `) ≤ ρ
]
≥ 1− 1
ρ
,
where ρ ≥ 1 is some arbitrary value.
In the lemma 6 at [17], the following inequality has been proved which put in our own notation
states
H
(
Ext(Zk, γu)
)
≥ `
(
1− dif(Ext(Zk, γu), V `)− 2−`
)
. (38)
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Taking into account that the output extractor sequence is just the key, we can write
H
(
Ext(Zk, γu)
)
= H
(
K`|Γu = γu
)
. (39)
Then by substituting (39) into (38), we have that the inequality
H
(
K`|Γu = γu
)
≥ `
(
1− dif(Ext(Zk, γu), V `)− 2−`
)
(40)
will hold with probability
PΓu [inequality (40) holds] ≥ 1− 1
ρ
. (41)
It follows from (41) a trivial estimate for the averaged value H
(
K`|Γu = γu) over γu, namely
H
(
K`|Γu
)
≥
(
1− 1
ρ
)
`
(
1− ρ− 2−`
)
. (42)
After a simplification on the right side of (42) and by neglecting smaller values than 2−`
H
(
K`|Γu
)
≥ `
(
1− ρ− 1
ρ
+ 
)
.
Then for the amount of information leaking of an adversary concerning the key K`, given the
knowledge of Γu, the following bound is obtained
I(K`;Zk|Γu) ≤ `
ρ
+ `(ρ− 1). (43)
The right side of (43) is minimized under the condition ρ = 1√

giving the final inequality
I(K`;Zk|Γu) ≤ 2`√
providing thus the desired result. 
It follows from the above lemma that if the value of the statistical difference at the extractor
output that forms the length ` key does not exceed , then the amount of the residual information
regarding the key obtained by the adversary does not exceed 2`
√
.
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This means that a requirement, regarding the amount of Shannon’s information on the key
leaking to an adversary, of the form I(K`;Zk|Γu) ≤ Iadm will be fulfilled if 2`√ = Iadm. This fact
results in the following requirement to the extractor’s statistical distance:
 =
(
Iadm
2`
)2
. (44)
3 Key distribution protocols
3.1 Statement of the protocols
Two key distribution protocols in presence of an active adversary have been proposed by Maurer
and Wolf in [17]: the UH-protocol, in which privacy amplification procedure was executed using
hash functions and the EX- protocol based on extractions. It has been shown in [17] that the EX-
protocol majors the UH-protocol with respect to several conditions.
We want to investigate a performance of these and other new protocols. We will show that our
new protocols are superior than those considered in [17] for non-asymptotic cases (e.g. when the
sequence lengths are finite).
Initially we consider modified UH- and EX-protocols and denote them as α and αext, respectively.
A difference between the original and the modified protocols is determined by two factors.
1. We consider protocols under the condition piA 6= 0, piB 6= 0, piA, piB < piE , or equivalently the
conditions pm > 0, pw > pm, see Figure 1. This requires to send the check symbols from A
to B in order to conciliate Xk and Y k.
2. Instead of the authentication algorithm “request-response” presented in [17], we will use non-
interactive the AC-based algorithm (see Section 2) because this allows the users to provide
authentication even when the sequences Xk and Y k do not coincide completely. By the same
reason, the authentication algorithm and the number of substrings of the original strings Xk
and Y k are changed.
Before the execution of the α, αext-protocols, the users A and B divide their respective sequences
Xk, Y k, into Xk11 , X
k2
2 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 of lengths k1, k2. (The first parts X
k1
1 and Y
k1
1 will be used
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for key generation in the execution of the PA procedure while the second parts Xk22 and Y
k2
2 will be
used in the execution of the authentication procedure). Since the α-protocol was already considered
in [22], we move on to the αext-protocol [31].
1. The user A forms the string Cr11 of check symbols of length r1 to the string X
k1
1 using a
(k1 + r1, k1)-error correcting code C1. (This code should be agreed by users in advance.)
2. The user A generates a truly random binary sequence γ (which will be used as an extractor
seed) of length u.
3. The user A forms the authenticator w for the message (Cr11 , γ) using for that an AC based
on an error correcting (n0, k0 = r1 + u, d)-code and the sequence X
k2
2 .
4. The user A sends to B the message (Cr11 , γ) over a PDC appended with the authenticator w.
5. The user B verifies the authenticity of the message (Cr11 , γ) through the known (n0, k0)-AC
and his string Y k22 (see section 2.5). If authenticity is confirmed, then B goes to the next
step. Otherwise he rejects the KDP.
6. The user B corrects the error in string Y k11 through the check symbols string C
r1
1 . We denote
by Y˜ k11 the string Y
k1
1 after error correction.
7. In order to get the keys KA and KB both users A and B execute a privacy amplification
procedure based on an extractor (see section 2.6): KA = Eext(X1, γ), KB = Eext(Y˜1, γ).
Recall that the α-protocol differs from the αext-protocol in that it generates a hash function h
in step 2. This hash function jointly with the check symbols of Cr11 and the authenticator w are
transmitted to B (steps 3-5). In the seventh step, this hash function is needed for key generation:
KA = h(X1), KB = h(Y˜1).
It has also been proposed in [22] a new β-protocol that differs from the α-protocol in the
following: After the execution of the initialization phase, both users A and B have got the strings
that can in fact be used to form the hash functions. In this way, we do not require to send the hash
functions over the PDC, hence the length k2 used before for authentication of the hash function
can be shortened. Therefore we may expect that the length of the substring X1 is increased (if the
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total length of the string X is fixed). But such conclusion is not so apparent because we have to
extract the hash function as a segment from the string X.
A similar problem appears in the case in which an extractor is used instead of a hash function
for privacy amplification. In the αext-protocol A generates a truly random sequence γ and sends
it to B jointly with the authenticator of γ. But the required sequence γ can be gotten directly by
both users A and B from the initially distributed strings X and Y . This results in the following
βext-protocol. It is worth to note that although γ is not uniformly distributed from the adversary’s
point of view this has no relevance for strong extractors.
Within the above setup, the users A and B divide the strings Xk, Y k into three disjoint parts
Xk11 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 with k1 + k2 + k3 = k. Then they execute the following steps:
1. The user A forms the length r1 string C
r1
1 of check symbols of the string X
k1
1 using the error
correcting (k1 + r1, k1)-code C1, agreed in advance.
2. The user A forms the length r2 check string C
r2
2 of the string X
k3
3 using the error correcting
(k3 + r2, k3)-code C2, agreed in advance.
3. The user A forms the authenticator w of the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ) using an AC and his substring
Xk22 .
4. The user A sends to B the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ) over a PDC appended with w.
5. The user B verifies the authenticity of the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ) using a AC and his substring
Y k22 . If it is confirmed then he goes to the next step. Otherwise he rejects the KDP.
6. The user B corrects errors on strings Y k11 , Y
k3
3 , using the check strings C
r1
1 and C
r2
2 . Denote
by Y˜ k11 , Y˜
k3
3 , the strings Y
k1
1 , Y
k3
3 , after error corrections.
7. The users A and B take their substrings Xk33 , Y˜
k3
3 , where k3 = u, as the second argument γ
u
in their extractors.
8. Both users A and B form the keys as KA = Eext(X1, X3), KB = Eext(Y˜1, Y˜3).
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3.2 Performance evaluation of the protocols
A theorem has been proved in [22] determining the optimal parameters for both the α, and β-
protocols depending on the posed requirements. Let us prove a generalization of that theorem for
the α, β, αext, and βext-protocols. We will assume that for the α, and β-protocols a hashing is
used as privacy amplification procedure, whereas for αext, and βext-protocols an extraction is used.
Moreover we assume that the first extraction scheme considered in section 2.6 is used, where the
number of random bits u is determined by equation (27).
Theorem 12 Let us assume that the users A, B and the adversary E have binary strings Xk, Y k
and Zk, respectively after execution of the initialization phase over the wire-tape channel, pw =
Pr (xi 6= yi), pw = min{Pr (xi 6= zi) ,Pr (yi 6= zi)}, pm ≥ 0, pw > pm. Then A and B are able to
form a common key of length ` satisfying the requirements (2)-(6) after the execution of any of
the α, β, αext, and βext-protocols if the parts of lengths k1, k2 on which were divided the substrings
Xk, Y k for the α, and αext-protocols or the parts of lengths k1, k2, k3 on which were divided the
substrings Xk, Y k for the β, and βext-protocols satisfy the equations listed below:
• for all protocols
k1 = − logP
adm
e
E(Rc1)
, (45)
• for α and β-protocols
k1 =
`+ r1 − 2 logP admrisk − log(Iadm ln 2)− 2
− log(p2w + (1− pw)2)
, (46)
• for αext, and βext-protocols
k1 ·H∞ = `c+ r1 − logP admrisk + u
+3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3, (47)
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where Rc1 and E(Rc1) are determined by (8)-(11) and
u =

⌈
log k1
(
Iadm
2`
)−2⌉
ln c
 ·
⌈
log k1
(
Iadm
2`
)−2⌉
(48)
is the number of the extractor random symbols, c is a parameter under optimization, H∞ =
− log max(pw, 1− pw),
k2
(
1− g
(
2d
k2
))
= 2k0, (49)
k2∑
i=∆w+1
(
k2
i
)
pim(1− pm)k2−i = P admf , (50)
∆w∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
piw(1− pw)d−i·
∆w−i∑
j=0
(
k2 − d
j
)
pjm(1− pm)k2−d−j = P admd , (51)
where
k0 =

k1 + r1 for the α-protocol,
2r1 for the β-protocol,
u+ r1 for the αext-protocol,
r1 + r2 for the βext-protocol,
(52)
and r2 being the number of check symbols of the error correcting (k3 +r2, k3)-code C2 found similarly
as in equation (45),
k3 =

0 for the α-protocol,
k1 for the β-protocol,
0 for the αext-protocol,
u for the βext-protocol.
(53)
The key rate is then determined as follows:
Rα =
`
k1 + k3
, Rβ =
`
2k1 + k3
,
Rαext = maxc
`
k1 + k2
, Rβext = maxc
`
u+ k1 + k2
. (54)
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Proof. For the α and β-protocols the theorem has been proved in [22]. Let us prove it only for
the αext, and βext-protocols.
Let the bounds of the KDP parameters meet exactly all requirements (2)-(6), e.g. the following
equation hold:
Pe = P
adm
e = 2
−k1E(Rc1)
where Rc1 =
k1
k1+r1
is the code rate, and E(Rc1) is computed by (8)-(10). Under the condition that
the adversary gets the sequence Zk1 over a BSC with error probability pw the conditional minimal
entropy is
H∞
(
Xk1 |Zk1
)
= k1H∞ (X|Z)
= −k1 log max(pw, 1− pw)
= k1H∞.
Since the adversary receives also the check block Cr11 , in line with (31) the following inequality
results:
H∞
(
Xk1 |Zk1 , Cr11
)
≥ k1H∞ − r1 − s, (55)
which does not comply with the probability Prisk ≤ 2−s.
By substituting (55) into (25), we may write ε ≤ 2 τ3 where τ = `c+3 log `−k1H∞+r1 +s+u+3.
Let us assume that Iadm is chosen in such a way that
2
τ
3 = log
(
Iadm
2`
)2
,
resulting thus condition (44). Hence we can write
`c+ 3 log `− k1H∞ + r1 + s+ u+ 3 = 3 log
(
Iadm
2`
)2
. (56)
Assuming Prisk = P
adm
risk = 2
−s, (56) holds eventually from (47). The value u in (56) is the number
of the extractor random symbols. In order to find it, we can use (27) substituting  by
(
Iadm
2`
)2
in
line with Lemma 1 that results in (48). A solution of the equation system (45) and (47) allows to
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find the parameters k1, r1, given a fixed c. It will be shown in the sequel that the key rate can be
maximized by a proper selection of the parameter c.
In order to find k2 let us assume that the probabilities Pf and Pd have equal values, Pf = P
adm
f ,
Pd = P
adm
d , with
P admf =
2n0∑
i=∆w+1
(
2n0
i
)
pim(1− pm)2n0−i, (57)
P admd =
∆w∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
piw(1− pw)d−i ·
∆w−i∑
j=0
(
2n0 − d
j
)
pjm(1− pm)2n0−d−j , (58)
where n0, k0, d are the parameters of error correcting codes used in the AC.
Recall that for the AC we had k2 = 2n0 where n0 is the length of the error correcting (n0, k0)-
code with minimum distance d. For the αext-protocol k0 = r1 + u, while for the βext-protocol
k0 = r1 + r2, where r2 is the number of check symbols in the (k3 + r2, k3)-code C2. This gives
relation (52) for the parameter k0.
Using the Varshamov-Gilbert inequality [32] connecting n0, k0, d and taking into account that
k2 = 2n0 we get
k2
(
1− g
(
2d
k2
))
= 2k0. (59)
Solving the equation system (57)-(59), equivalent to the equation system (49)-(51), we find the
parameters k2, d. The value r2 is calculated by (8)-(10), in which it is necessary to let k = ur = r2,
p = pm, Pe = P
adm
e .
In line with the above protocols, we have that for the αext-protocol, k3 = 0 and for the βext-
protocol, k3 = u. This fact proves (53). Then relation (54) is apparent from the protocols descrip-
tion.
Remark 1 If the solution of the system (45)-(53) is not unique then it is reasonable to select any
of them maximizing the key rate.
Remark 2 It is worth to note that the values k1, k2, k3, c found for the same requirements P
adm
e ,
Iadm, P admrisk , P
adm
f , P
adm
d , but for different protocols, may be different.
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Figure 3: Dependence of key rate versus the parameter extractor c for the αext-protocol.
Remark 3 (Choice of c in (47)-(48)) In figures 3 and 4 the dependence of the key rate for the
αext-protocol and the βext-protocol is plotted versus the parameter c, given fixed values ` for different
error probabilities in the main channels.
We assume that pw = 0.2, I
adm = 10−30, P adme = P admrisk = P
adm
f = P
adm
d = 10
−5 in the plotting
of these curves. From these curves it is patent that the key rate depends essentially on the choice
of the parameter c.
Let us compare the α, β, αext, βext-protocols on the key rates.
Theorem 13 If the key length ` is given and the rate Rc of the error correction code satisfies
Rc ≥ 23 , then Rβ ≥ Rα, and Rβext ≥ Rαext.
Proof. The first inequality is proved as theorem 10 in [22]. Let us prove the second inequality.
Let us write Rαext =
`
k1+k2
and Rβext =
`′
k′1+u+k
′
2
. For a fixed common length, ` = `′, we should
prove k′1 + u+ k′2 ≤ k1 + k2.
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Figure 4: Dependence of key rate versus the parameter extractor c for the βext-protocol.
Under the requirements (1), (2), (6) posed to the KDP parameters, Prisk, I
adm, it follows
from (47) that `′ = ` whenever k1 = k′1 and r1 = r′1. Therefore it is necessary just to prove
k2 ≥ u+ k′2. (60)
According to the scheme of the AC code design we can write k2 = 2n0 = 2(r1 + u+ r0), where r0
is the number of check symbols of the (n0, k0)-code. k
′
2 = 2n
′
0 = 2(r1 + r
′
2 + r
′
0), where r
′
2 is the
number of check symbols of the (u+ r′2, r′2)-code C2, and r′0 is the number of check symbols of the
(n′0, k′0)-code.
By substituting the expressions for k2, k
′
2 presented above into (60), we get the equivalent
inequality u − 2r′2 + 2r0 − 2r′0 ≥ 0. In order to prove this inequality it is sufficient to show that
u ≥ 2r′2 and r0 ≥ r′0.
The first inequality holds because under the theorem’s condition, Rc ≥ 23 for the (u + r′2, r′2)-
code. In order to prove the second inequality, we note that r0 is the number of check symbols of the
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information block of length k0 = u+ r1 and r
′
0 is the number of check symbols of the information
block of length k′0 = r1 + r′2. It is clear that k0 ≥ k′0 and it is followed from Varshamov-Gilbert
inequality that dn0 maintains a constant value as the information block length increases in order to
get the required error correction capability. Therefore r0 ≥ r′0 and this completes the proof of the
theorem. 
With the purpose of comparing the protocols performance with hashing and with extraction,
let us find the relation of key rate for sufficiently large `.
Theorem 14 As the key length `→∞, then the following relations hold
Rα =
H2(pw)− g(pm)
3 + 2g(pm)
, (61)
Rβ =
H2(pw)− g(pm)
2 + 4g(pm)
, (62)
Rαext = Rβext =
H∞(pw)− g(pm)
1 + 2g(pm)
. (63)
Proof. The proofs of (61) and (62) were presented in [22]. In order to prove (63), let us write the
relations of the key rates at the αext and βext-protocols taking into account (20), (52), (53), (54):
Rαext =
`
k1 + 2n0
=
`
k1 + k2
=
`
k1 + 2(k0 + r0)
=
`
k1 + 2u+ 2r1 + 2r0
, (64)
Rβext =
`
k1 + u+ 2n0
=
`
k1 + u+ k2
=
`
k1 + u+ 2(k0 + r0)
=
`
k1 + u+ 2u+ 2r1 + 2r0
, (65)
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where u is the length of the extractor seed, r1 is the length of the check string for the (k1 + r1, k1)-
code, r2 is the length of the check symbols string for the (u + r2, u)-code, and r0 is the length of
the check string for the AC-code.
According to (13), r = k g(pm) for sufficiently large ` (and hence sufficiently large k). Let us
rewrite (64), (65) as
Rαext =
`
k1(1 + 2g(pm)) + 2u+ 2r0
, (66)
Rβext =
`
(k1 + u)(1 + 2g(pm)) + 2r0
. (67)
According with (47),
k1 =
`c− 2 logPrisk + u+ 3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3
H∞ − g(pm) . (68)
Substituting k1 into (66) produces
Rαext =
H∞ − g(pm)
c(1 + 2g(pm)) + 2 (H∞ − g(pm))
(
u
` +
r0
`
) . (69)
It is easy to show that
lim
`→∞
u
`
= 0.
Also theorem 5 establishes that lim`→∞ r0k0+r0 = 0, but since k0 →∞ as long as `→∞, according
to (47) and (52) we get lim`→∞ r0` = 0. Now we can write (69), in the limit Rαext =
H∞(pw)−g(pm)
c(1+2g(pm))
,
which approaches to a maximum as c→ 1. This provides a proof of (63) for the αext-protocol.
Similarly, by expressing Rβext as (67) using k1 as in (68), the used arguments in the proof of (63)
for the αext-protocol, show that (63) holds also for the βext-protocol. 
The following trivial corollary results from the above theorem.
Corollary 1 If the channel parameters pm and pw are such that
H∞(pw)− g(pm)
1 + 2g(pm)
≥ H2(pw)− g(pm)
3 + 2g(pm)
(70)
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and
2 (H∞(pw)− g(pm)) ≥ H2(pw)− g(pm), (71)
then Rαext ≥ Rα and Rβext ≥ Rβ respectively for sufficiently large `.
Corollary 2 If pm = 0, then Rαext ≥ Rα and Rβext ≥ Rβ.
Proof. If pm = 0, then the relations (70), (71) can be written as
H∞(pw) ≥ 1
3
H2(pw) and H∞(pw) ≥ 1
2
H2(pw).
Since 2H∞(pw) ≥ H2(pw) [14], then Rαext ≥ Rα and Rβext ≥ Rβ. 
Let us exemplify the above results and illustrate that the Rαext(`) and Rβext(`)-protocols major
the Rα(`) and Rβ(`)-protocols respectively. Let us select the following natural requirements for the
KDP:
Iadm = 10−30 , Pd = Pe = Pf = Prisk = 10−5. (72)
In figure 5 we plot the key rates Rk versus its length ` for both Rαext(`) and Rβext(`)-protocols
with pm = 0.01 and 0.001, pw = 0.2, and the requirements presented in (72).
The optimization of c has been performed for every value of `. For comparison purposes the
dependences Rα(`) and Rβ(`) are shown also in the figure.
The following conclusions are drawn immediately after an examination of the obtained depen-
dence.
The protocols using extractors have greater key rate than the α and β-protocols under sufficiently
large ` and small pm. It is worth to note that if for the α and β-protocols the asymptotically possible
value key rate calculated by (61), (62) can be achieved even in the considered key length range, it
is not true for the αext and βext-protocols, demonstrating a noticeable increasing proliferation of
the key rate outside this range.
We can see that the αext-protocol is superior than the α-protocol when ` > 5 · 105 with pm =
0.01 and the βext-protocol is superior than the β-protocol when ` > 3.5 · 106 and pm = 0.001
(under the stated requirements in our investigations). The key length for which the αext and βext-
protocols are superior than the α and β-protocols essentially depends on the error probabilities in
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Figure 5: The key rates versus their lengths for different requirements imposed to KDPs.
the communication channels.
The βext-protocol is superior than the αext-protocol, although these protocols have the same
asymptotic key rate. Hence, protocols with extractors are superior than the protocols with hashing,
when pm = 0.
4 Key distribution protocols under the condition that legal users
shared short authentication key before starting the KDP
The α′ and β′-protocols have been introduced in [22], which differ from the α and β-protocols in
that legal users A and B have got a short key SA = SB of length `0 before starting the KDP. This
key can be used for authentication of messages transmitted over public discussion channels in order
to get finally the key of length ` >> `0.
In this section we consider some modification of the α′ and β′-protocols in which instead of hash
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functions, extractors are used in order to generate the final key. We call these protocols the α′ext
and β′ext-protocols, respectively.
α′ext-protocol Let us suppose that the users A and B have binary strings Xk, Y k respectively.
1. The user A calculates the check string Cr of length r for the stringXk using an error correcting
(k + r, k)-code C that should be agreed between the legal users in advance.
2. The user A generates a random binary string γu of length u.
3. The user A computes the authenticator w for the message (Cr, γu) using a keyed hash function
from the -ASU2 class, and the key SA.
4. The user A sends to user B over a PDC the message (Cr, γu) appending to it the authenticator
w.
5. The user B verifies the authenticity of (Cr, γu) using the algorithm presented in section 2. If
the authenticity of (Cr, γu) is confirmed, then B goes to the next step, otherwise he rejects
it.
6. The user B corrects errors in the string Y k using the check string Cr. (We denote by Y˜ k the
string Y k after error correction).
7. Both users A and B compute their keys as KA = Eext(X
k, γu), KB = Eext(Y˜
k, γu).
β′ext-protocol In a similar manner there is a modified β-protocol where the random string γu is
not transmitted over the PDC but it is formed from the random sequences Xk, Y k.
The users A and B divide each of the strings Xk, Y k obtained after execution of the initialization
phase into two disjoint substringsXk11 , X
k2
2 ; Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , respectively. Then they perform the following
steps:
1. The user A calculates the check string Cr11 of length r1 for the substring X
k1
1 using an error
correcting (k1 + r1, k1)-code C1.
2. The user A calculates the check string Cr22 of length r2 for the substring X
k2
2 using an error
correcting (k2 + r2, k2)-code C2.
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3. The user A forms the authenticator w for the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ), using a keyed hash function
from the class -ASU2 and the key SA with length `0.
4. The user A sends to B the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ) appended with the authenticator w.
5. The user B verifies the authenticity of the message (Cr11 , C
r2
2 ) using the authentication algo-
rithm (see section 2) and the key SB. If authenticity is confirmed, then user B goes to the
next step, otherwise he rejects the KDP.
6. The user B corrects errors in the strings Y k11 , Y
k2
2 using the check strings C
r1
1 and C
r2
2 . (We
denote by Y˜ k11 , Y˜
k2
2 the strings Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 after error correction.)
7. The user A takes the string Xk22 as seed γ
u and the user B takes the string Y˜ k22 as seed γ
u.
8. Both users A and B compute their keys as KA = Eext(X
k1
1 , X
k2
2 ), KB = Eext(Y˜
k1
1 , Y˜
k2
2 ).
Let us estimate the key rate of these protocols.
Theorem 15 Let us suppose that the users A, B and the adversary E have binary strings Xk, Y k
and Zk, respectively after execution of the initialization phase over the wire-tape channel, pm =
Pr (xi 6= yi), pw = min(Pr (xi 6= zi) ,Pr (yi 6= zi), pm ≥ 0, pw > pm. We assume that the users A
and B share initially a short key S of length `0 in order to authenticate messages transmitted over
the PDC.
Then A and B are able to form a common key of length ` satisfying the requirements (2)-(6)
after the execution of the α′ext and β′ext-protocols if the lengths k1, k2 of substrings Xk, Y k and Zk
and `0 satisfy the equations listed below:
k1 = − logP
adm
e
E(Rc1)
, (73)
k1 ·H∞ = `c+ r1 − logP admrisk + u
+3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3, (74)
where Rc1 and E(Rc1) are calculated by (10)-(12) and
k2 =
 0 for the α
′
ext-protocol,
u for the β′ext-protocol,
(75)
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and
u =

⌈
log k1
(
Iadm
2`
)−2⌉
ln c
 ·
⌈
log k1
(
Iadm
2`
)−2⌉
(76)
is the number of the extractor random symbols, c is the parameter under optimization,
`0 =
a(2 + i)
2i
, (77)
i+ 1
2
a
2i
≤ P admd , (78)
where
a =
 r1 + u for the α
′
ext-protocol,
r1 + r2 for the β
′
ext-protocol,
(79)
and r2 being the number of check symbols of the error correcting (k2 +r2, k2)-code C2 found similarly
as in eq’s (73)-(74). The key rate is then determined as:
Rα′ext = maxc
`
k1
, Rβ′ext = maxc
`
k1 + k2
. (80)
Proof. The relations (73), (74) and (76) can be proved similarly as (45), (46) and (47) in
theorem 10. The relation (75) is apparent from the protocols description. In order to prove (77), (78)
we assume that for authentication of messages of length a (see relation (79)) an -ASU2-hash-
function is used. Relying on (15) we write 2a = q2
i
, 2`0 = qi+2,  = i+1q . Let us put q = 2
b,
then
a = 2ib , `0 = b(i+ 2) ,  =
i+ 1
2b
. (81)
Let us assume that the probability of false message deception is equal to  = P admd . Then from (81),
the relations (77), (78) are valid. The relation (80) follows from the protocols definition taking into
account that the number of the extractor random bits can be optimized with respect to c. 
By substituting (74) into (80) and using (13) we get that as `→∞:
Rα′ext =
` [H∞ − g(pm)]
Den1
, (82)
Rβ′ext =
` [H∞ − g(pm)]
Den2
, (83)
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Figure 6: Key rates versus its length for different KDP provided initially with short authentication
keys.
where
Den1 = `c− logPrisk + u+ 3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3,
Den2 = Den1 + u.
From (82), (83), we have Rα′ext ≥ Rβ′ext . When `→∞ both protocols have the same key rates
Rα′ext = Rβ′ext = H∞ − g(pm). (84)
Let us compare the key rates of the α′ext and β′ext-protocols and the α′ and β′-protocols. In [22]
the following relations have been proved:
Rα′ → H2(pw)− g(pm)
Rβ′ → 12 [H2(pw)− g(pm)]
 as `→∞.
Comparing these relations with (84) we may conclude that Rα′ ≥ Rα′ext = Rβ′ext for any values pw
and pm. Rβ′ can be either larger or smaller than Rα′ext = Rβ′ext depending on the ratio of pw and
pm.
In order to illustrate the above assertions we plot in figure 6 the dependence of the key rate
versus its length for the α′, β′, α′ext and β′ext-protocols, given pw = 0.2, pm = 0.01 and Iadm = 10−30,
P adme = P
adm
d = P
adm
risk = 10
−5.
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Table 1: Groups of hybrid protocols
Protocol group Authentication
key gen-
eration
Key gen-
eration
1 (α, α′), (α, β′),
(β, α′), (β, β′)
hashing hashing
2 (α, α′ext), (α, β′ext),
(β, α′ext), (β, β′ext)
hashing extracting
3 (αext, α
′), (αext, β′),
(βext, α
′), (βext, β′)
extracting hashing
4 (αext, α
′
ext),
(αext, β
′
ext),
(βext, α
′
ext),
(βext, β
′
ext)
extracting extracting
5 Two-stage (hybrid) protocols with extractors
We remember that the hybrid protocols [22, 25] are combinations of protocol pairs (α, α′), (α, β′),
(β, α′), (β, β′) where the first protocol in each pair is used in order to generate a relatively short
key S of length `0 required for hash function and check bits authentication, whereas the second
protocol is used in order to form the final key K.
The keys S and K can be obtained by execution of the privacy amplification procedure based
either on the use of hash functions or extractors. This means that for every above mentioned hybrid
protocol pair, there are four variants of hashing or extracting applications. In total, there can be
formed 16 protocols, which in turn can be split into four groups as shown in table 1.
The first group of protocols was investigated in [22], and there it has been proved that every
such protocol can be the most efficient depending on the additional key requirements imposed to
it. It is worth to note that even for large length ` of the key K, the length `0 of the authentication
key occurs moderate [22] (p. 2543). If ` = 32000 (pm = 0.01, pw = 0.2, P
adm = 5 · 10−6), then
`0 = 678. But since, as shown in section 3, extractors are superior than hash functions only with
large key lengths, their application is useless in the first stage of the hybrid protocols, where a short
key is required.
Therefore, the protocols from groups 3 and 4 have not been considered. It is sufficient to
investigate protocols from the second group, where the authentication key is generated by hashing
and the generation of the final keys is performed by extraction. Thus we consider the following
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Figure 7: Different types of hybrid protocol with extractors.
hybrid protocols: (α, α′ext), (α, β′ext), (β, α′ext), (β, β′ext). For a more detailed description with the
design of these protocols and the specification requirements of each protocol component, we refer
to [22] (p. 2544).
Let us give a short description of the (α, α′ext)-protocol. It is based on the (α, α′)-protocol
proposed by Korzhik and Morales [25]. In this protocol, the sequences Xk, Y k of users A and B
are divided into three parts Xk11 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 respectively (see figure 7-a). The
subsequences Xk11 , X
k2
2 , (Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 ) are used for the generation of the authentication keys SA (SB).
The subsequence Xk33 (Y
k3
3 ) and the key SA (SB) are used in the α
′
ext-protocol for final KA (KB)
key generation. The key rate of this protocol can be written as
R(α,α′ext) =
`
k1 + k2 + k3
=
`
k3 +
`0
Rα
, (85)
where Rα =
`
k1+k2
is the key S rate at the length `0 in the α-protocol.
Let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The convergence `0` → 0, as `→∞, holds in the (α, α′ext)-protocol.
Proof. Let us consider the (α, α′ext)-protocol. According to (79) the input block length of the
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-ASU2 hash function used in the αext-protocol is equal to a = r3 + u. We show initially that
r3 + u→∞ as `→∞. The relations (76) and (11) give
u ≈
(
log k3
(
Iadm
2`
)−2)2
ln c
, (86)
r3 = (1−Rc)k3. (87)
Thus in order to prove that r3 + u → ∞ it is necessary to show that k3 → ∞ as ` → ∞. Taking
into account equation (13), we can present (74) in the form
k3 =
`c− logP admrisk + u+ 3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3
H∞(pw)− g(pm) . (88)
From the above relation, it follows that k3 → ∞ as ` → ∞ and both (86), (87) result as r3 → ∞
and u→∞. Then using (77) for an estimation of the hash function parameters, we may write
lim
i→∞
`0
a
= lim
i→∞
i+ 2
2i
= 0.

Using (88), the relation (85) can be expressed as
R(α,α′ext) =
H∞(pw)− g(pm)
Den3
, (89)
where
Den3 = c
−`−1
[
logP admrisk + u+ 3 log `
(
Iadm
2`
)−2
+ 3
]
+
`0
`
H∞(pw)− g(pm)
Rα
.
Taking into account that Rα is constant and
`0
` → 0 (see Lemma 2) we can see that the last
term in the denominator Den3 of (89) approaches to zero as ` → ∞. The other terms in the
denominator Den3 also approach to zero because they consist either of values approaching zero or
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have a logarithmic dependence on `.
Since the right side of (89) approaches a maximum, R(α,α′ext) approaches a maximum as c→ 1,
then the following asymptotic estimation holds for the key rate of the (α, α′ext)-protocol
R(α,α′ext) = H∞(pw)− g(pm), (90)
R∗(α,α′ext) = H∞(pw) as pm → 0. (91)
In the (β, α′ext)-protocol (see figure 7-b) the sequences Xk, Y k are divided into four parts X
k1
1 ,
Xk22 , X
k3
3 , X
k4
4 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 , Y
k4
4 , respectively. The subsequences X
k1
1 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3 and Y
k1
1 ,
Y k22 , Y
k3
3 are used in the β-protocol in order to generate the authentication key S of length `0.
The subsequence Xk44 (Y
k4
4 ) is used in the α
′
ext-protocol for final keys KA, KB generation. One can
write
R(β,α′ext) =
`
k4 +
`0
Rβ
,
where Rβ =
`0
k1+k2+k3
is the authentication key rate.
By comparing this protocol with the previous one, we can conclude that for the same length `
of the final key, the equality k4 = k3 should hold. As it was shown in [22], Rβ ≥ Rα and the length
`0 of authentication key for the α-protocol is larger than the length `0 of the authentication key
for the β-protocol. Hence
`0(α-protocol)
Rα
≥ `0(β-protocol)
Rβ
and R(β,α′ext) ≥ R(α,α′ext).
It is easy to show that
R(β,α′ext) = H∞(pw)− g(pm) as `→∞, (92)
that coincides with the key rate of the (α, α′ext)-protocol, see (91). If pm = 0 we get by (92)
R∗(β,α′ext) = H∞(pm).
Next let us consider the (α, β′ext)-protocol (see figure 7-c) in which each sequence Xk, Y k is
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divided into four parts Xk11 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3 , X
k4
4 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 , Y
k4
4 , respectively. The subsequences
Xk11 , X
k2
2 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 are used in the α-protocol for the generation of the key SA, or SB for the
β′ext-protocol, while subsequences X
k3
3 , X
k4
4 and Y
k3
3 , Y
k4
4 are used in the β
′
ext-protocol for the final
key KA (KB) generation assuming X
k4
4 and Y
k4
4 as random “seeds” γ
k4 while using in extractor.
Similarly to (85) we can write
R(α,β′ext) =
`
k3 + u+
`0
Rα
.
The parameter `0 is smaller in this protocol than in the (α, α
′
ext)-protocol, because only to au-
thenticate the check sequences Xk33 and X
k4
4 of total length r1 + r2 there is used an -ASU2 hash-
function. However the additional item (u) calculated by (76) increases the denominator and hence
R(α,β′ext) ≤ R(α,α′ext).
In the (β, β′ext)-protocol, each sequence Xk, Y k is divided into five parts X
k1
1 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3 , X
k4
4 ,
Xk55 and Y
k1
1 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 , Y
k4
4 Y
k5
5 , respectively (see figure 7-d). The subsequences X
k1
1 , X
k2
2 , X
k3
3
and Y k11 , Y
k2
2 , Y
k3
3 are used in the β-protocol to generate the keys SA, SB. The subsequences X
k4
4 ,
Xk55 and Y
k4
4 Y
k5
5 are used in the β
′
ext-protocol to generate the keys KA, KB. Let us write
R(β,β′ext) =
`
k4 + u+
`0
Rβ
.
In this relation by the same reason mentioned during the analysis of the (α, β′ext)-protocol, the
value `0 will be smaller than in the (β, α
′
ext)-protocol and the rate Rβ is larger. Therefore the third
item is slightly decreasing. However the presence of sufficiently large item u results in a key rate
decreasing giving the inequality R(β,β′ext) ≤ R(β,α′ext).
There may be for the (α, β′ext), (β, α′ext)-protocols some equivalent statement to Lemma 2, e.g.
it can be proved that `0` → 0 as ` → ∞. Furthermore, by writing the relations for k3, k4 and u,
from theorem 12 it is very simple to get asymptotically achievable the key rate for the (α, β′ext),
(β, α′ext)-protocols.
R(α,βext) = R(β,β′ext) = H∞(pw)− g(pm). (93)
Comparing (90), (92) and (93) we can see that asymptotically all hybrid protocols have the same
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Figure 8: The key rates for hybrid protocol.
key rates, however the (β, α′ext)-protocol has non-asymptotically the largest key rate among all
above considered hybrid protocols.
It is worth to compare this protocol with the (β, α′)-protocol, that (as shown in [22]) has
maximum possible key rate for sufficiently large ` among all hybrid protocols using hash functions
in the privacy amplification procedure.
For the (β, α′)-protocol one can write [22]
R(β,α′) = H2(pm)− g(pm) (94)
By comparing (92) with (94) and taking into account that H2(pm) ≥ H∞(pm) we can see that for
large `, R(β,α′ext) ≥ R(β,α′ext).
From this inequality, it follows that an implementation of extractors for large key length in
hybrid protocols are inefficient.
In figure 8 there are plotted the key rates versus its length for hybrid protocols under the
conditions pm = 0.01, pw = 0.2, I
adm = 10−30, P adme = P admd = P
adm
f = 10
−5.
The curves R(`) were plotted with the use of the technique proposed in [22]. They clearly
demonstrate a behavior of the key rate depending on the key length for different protocols. We can
see that the (α, α′) and (β, α′)-protocols have the greatest key rates among all hybrid protocols. The
(α, β′), (β, β′), (α, α′ext), and (β, α′ext)-protocols have approximately equal key rates for large key
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length and the (α, β′ext) and (β, β′ext)-protocols have the least key rate among the above considered
hybrid protocols.
6 Conclusions
In the current paper, an investigation of key distribution protocols based on noisy channels started
in [22] has been continued with such a difference that extractors are used instead of hash-functions in
the privacy amplification procedure. The main goal was to prove extractor-based protocols efficiency
by the criterion of key rate maximization. The relations are non-asymptotic and constructive
because they do not include some uncertain coefficients in notations, in contrast with other papers.
We use the modified Trevisan’s extractor [30, 29] in our paper. It has been proposed new βext
and β∗ext-protocols which differ from those known before [17] because the extractor’s seed is not
transmitted over the PDC but, instead, it is generated from random sequences obtained by legal
user after the execution of the initialization phase. We proved that the use of extractors in the
αext and βext-protocols increases the rate, in comparison with hashing-based protocols only for very
large key length ` (typically ` ∈ [105, 106]) and for some specified values of the error probabilities
both in the main and in the wire-tap channels.
It was investigated a performance evaluation of the so called extractor-based hybrid protocols,
consisting of two protocols executed in a serial manner where the first protocol in a pair is used for
the generation of a relatively short key S of length `0. This key is necessary for authentication of
check bits, and a random number (seed) of extractor. The second protocol is used for the final key
generation. We prove that extractor based protocols should be used only in the second protocol of
the pair.
We selected four hybrid protocols for further investigation (α, α′ext), (β, α′ext), (α, β′ext) and
(β, β′ext)-protocols. The relations for their key rates have been derived for both finite and asymp-
totically growing key lengths. The greatest key rate is got for the (β, α′ext)-protocol. This protocol
was compared with the (β, α′)-protocol considered in [22], which has the greatest key rate among
all hybrid hashing-based protocols. The investigations showed that hybrid protocols with the use
of extractor-based second stage protocols are less efficient than hashing-based protocol.
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We investigated also (but not in a deeper detail) other variants of extractors from [29]. Even with
some improvement of their characteristics (in the sense of the seed length), the general conclusion
is kept the same: the use of extractors is justified only with very large key length.
We get also asymptotic estimates for the key rates of all proposed protocols that allows to
compare the potential efficiency of all considered early protocols. These relations are presented
in table 2. We can see that asymptotically all hybrid protocols have the same key rates equal to
H∞(pw) − g(pm), that is larger than the key rates for single αext and βext-protocols that is equal
to H∞(pw)−g(pm)1+2g(pm) .
These relations are similar “on structure” to relations for key capacity g(pw)− g(pm), [19], but
differ from the last one in changing of Shannon’s entropy g(pw) to min entropy H∞(pw).
If the main channel is noiseless then all protocols using extractors have the same asymptotic key
rates equal to H∞(pw). It is worth to note that asymptotically all hybrid extractor-based protocols
are inferior to hash-based protocols. But this conclusion may be considered as a consequence of
crude estimate of information leaking to eavesdropper based on the use of min entropy.
We summarize the key rates for different KDP in table 2. It can be seen from this table how
closer or farther are the key rates to the secret key capacity given by (7).
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